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Disability Harassment: How Far Should the ADA Follow 
in the Footsteps of Title VII? 
Leah C. Myers 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Congress’s statement of findings and purposes for the Americans 
with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”) estimated that 43 million 
Americans suffer from one or more physical or mental disabilities.1 That 
figure has risen to 52.6 million Americans in 1997, or 19.7% of the U.S. 
population, according to the Census Bureau.2 Congress also found that 
throughout history and in present times, people with disabilities have 
been isolated, segregated, and discriminated against in fundamental areas 
of life such as employment, housing, and education.3 As a result, 
Congress enacted the ADA “to provide a clear and comprehensive 
national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals 
with disabilities.”4 
One of these areas of life that Congress chose to focus on was 
employment, as seen in the fact that an entire title of the ADA, Title I, is 
devoted to this topic. Congressional hearings referenced data that two-
thirds of Americans with disabilities between the ages of 16 and 64 are 
unemployed despite the fact that two-thirds of these unemployed, 
working-age people with disabilities would like to have a job.5 
In the wake of the enactment of the ADA in 1990, the federal courts 
have been working to clarify the available claims and mode of 
enforcement of the Act. One particular claim, disability harassment, the 
focus of this article, has been constantly in flux. The availability of a 
sexual6 harassment claim for a hostile work environment under Title VII 
 
 1. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (2001). 
 2. JACK MCNEIL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES: 1997 (Feb. 
2001), available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/disable/sipp/disable97.html. 
 3. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2)-(3) (2001). 
 4. See id., § 12101(b)(1). 
 5. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 314. 
 6. Preceding the development of sexual harassment claims for hostile work environment 
were hostile environment claims given other protected characteristics. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) (race); Compston v. Borden, 
Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (religion). Sexual harassment will be the claim of 
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of the Civil Rights Act of 19647 has been evolving since 1986.8  While 
several district courts have definitively held that a comparable disability 
harassment claim exists under the ADA,9 it was not until 2001 that two 
federal circuit courts of appeals delivered such a holding.10 Until these 
two perhaps critical holdings, the circuit courts of appeals had generally 
assumed without deciding that a disability harassment claim existed 
under the ADA.11 These courts then denied every claim case-by-case as 
having insufficient evidence to succeed on such a claim, thus allowing 
avoidance of the question of the existence of a disability harassment 
claim.12 Perhaps these two Courts of appeal decisions signal the start of a 
trend under which the federal courts will accept disability harassment 
claims more definitively. 
While these two cases may signal growing recognition of disability 
harassment claims, questions remain about whether it is appropriate to 
utilize harassment analysis from Title VII precedent in ADA claims.13 In 
certain instances, including cases of disparate treatment discrimination 
and retaliation, courts have applied Title VII analysis to ADA cases.14 
However, important distinctions between the two statutes indicate that 
such borrowing of analysis is not always appropriate.15 
 
harassment under Title VII used in this note for comparison to disability harassment because most 
Title VII harassment cases involve discrimination based on sex. Lisa Eichhorn, Hostile Environment 
Actions, Title VII, and the ADA: the Limits of the Copy-and-Paste Function, 77 WASH. L. REV. 575, 
580 (July 2002). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et. seq (2001). 
 8. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986). 
 9. See, e.g., Lanni v. State, 177 F.R.D. 295, 304 (D. N.J. 1998); Haysman v. Food Lion, 
Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 1106-07 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Davis v. York Int’l Inc., No. CIV.A. HAR 92-
3545, 1993 WL 524761, at *9-10 (D. Md. 1993). 
 10. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 11. See, e.g., Vollmert v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v. 
Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Wallin v. Minn. Dep’t of 
Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687-88 (8th Cir. 1998); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 
558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 12. See supra note 11. 
 13. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 578-80 (asserting that Title VII framework should 
not be applied to hostile work environment claims under the ADA because each statute employs 
very different visions of equality and discrimination); Christine Neagle, An Analysis of the 
Applicability of Hostile Work Environment Liability to the ADA, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 715, 728 
(2001) (describing argument that in order to effectuate the goals of the ADA, a disability harassment 
claim must be recognized); Frank S. Ravitch, Beyond Reasonable Accommodation: the Availability 
and Structure of a Cause of Action for Workplace Harassment Under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1522 (1994) (encouraging a modified Title VII analysis 
of disability harassment claims under the ADA, incorporating the concept of reasonable 
accommodation and its defenses). 
 14. See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 68-72 and accompanying text. 
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This article discusses whether courts should recognize a disability 
harassment claim under Title I of the ADA, and if so, whether courts 
should adopt the same analysis as that which is applied to harassment 
claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Part II provides 
history for this topic by investigating whether these two statutes have 
analogous visions of employment discrimination as seen through 
statutory text and legislative history. Part II also outlines the types of 
employment discrimination claims available under both Title VII and the 
ADA and discusses which ADA claims are evaluated through adopting 
Title VII analysis. Part III focuses on the topic of disability harassment 
by first summarizing how the courts have addressed disability 
harassment claims so far. Part III then explores whether Title VII 
harassment analysis, employed primarily in sexual harassment cases, 
coincides with the purposes and text of the ADA. Next, Part IV proposes 
a resolution to this issue by suggesting a reasonable victim analysis for 
disability harassment claims after discussing several standards that have 
been debated in the harassment context. Finally, Part V provides some 
further support for allowing disability harassment claims under the ADA. 
II. HISTORY 
According to the legislative history for Title VII, the purpose of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 was to establish “a congressionally declared 
national policy of nondiscrimination, based on race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin in matters of promotion and employment.”16 Similarly, 
the text of the statute specifies one purpose of the ADA is, “to provide a 
clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 
discrimination against individuals with disabilities.”17 
A. Employment Discrimination Under Title VII and the ADA: 
Statutory Language 
Although Title VII was passed in 1964, legislative attempts to 
address employment discrimination based on characteristics including 
the five covered in that Act had been developing in decades prior to 
1964. Perhaps the earliest regulation was in the Civil Service Act of 
1883, which included a ban on religious discrimination in federal 
employment.18 Further regulation in this area developed, including 
provisions in New Deal legislation, executive orders addressing 
 
 16. U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 3119 (1968) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (2001). 
 18. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 1. 
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government contracts, and state fair employment practice laws.19 This 
history reveals a national awareness of the need to develop a policy 
addressing employment discrimination on the basis of minority and 
gender status, eventually culminating in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and 
its later amendments. 
Title I of the ADA and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have 
shared visions of civil rights protection as shown by the statutory text 
and legislative history of the ADA. For example, the ADA explicitly 
states that specific enforcement provisions under Title VII are to serve 
also as the powers, remedies and procedures of Title I.20 In addition, the 
ADA incorporates by reference the definitions of “employee” and 
“employer” from Title VII.21 More broadly, the House Judiciary 
Committee stated: “The Americans With Disabilities Act completes the 
circle begun in 1973 with respect to persons with disabilities by 
extending to them the same civil rights protections provided to women 
and minorities beginning in 1964.”22 
Nonetheless, given key differences between the two statutes, the 
whole of Title VII analysis has not been applied to ADA claims. First 
and most importantly, the prohibition of discrimination under the ADA 
includes an affirmative duty to reasonably accommodate, limited by an 
affirmative defense where such accommodation would cause an undue 
hardship on the employer.23 The term “reasonable accommodation” can 
also be found in Title VII, in a much different context.24 Title VII 
incorporates reasonable accommodation within its definition of one 
protected class, religion: “The term ‘religion’ includes all aspects of 
religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer 
demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an 
 
 19. Id. at 1-6. 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (2001). 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(II), at 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 359. 
 22. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485(III), at 26 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449. In 
fact, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights has stated that, “[T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 served as 
a model for future civil rights laws, including the ADA.” U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, HELPING 
EMPLOYERS COMPLY WITH THE ADA, 15 (1998) [hereinafter HELPING EMPLOYERS]. 
 23. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2001). This provision provides: 
(5)(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental 
limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or 
employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would 
impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or 
(5)(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of 
such covered entity to make reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
impairments of the employee or applicant. 
Id. 
 24. See Pamela S. Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and 
Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 6-7 (1996). 
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employee’s or prospective employee’s religious observance or practice 
without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer’s business.”25 
In order to avoid a conflict with the Establishment Clause of the First 
Amendment, however, the Supreme Court limited this duty to reasonably 
accommodate religion under Title VII by recognizing that any cost 
greater than a de minimis cost constitutes an undue hardship negating the 
duty.26 In contrast, reasonable accommodation under the ADA can have 
a much greater cost to employers, although the precise breadth of the 
duty has yet to be clearly defined by the courts.27 
Second, the provisions of the ADA only can be invoked by a 
“qualified individual with a disability,” which is defined as, “an 
individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable 
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment 
position that such individual holds or desires.”28  “Disability” is defined 
as: “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or 
more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such 
impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.”29 The 
U.S. Supreme Court recently clarified the meaning of part A of this 
definition of disability under the ADA. The Court held: “to be 
substantially limited in performing manual tasks, an individual must have 
an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from 
doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily 
lives. The impairment’s impact must also be permanent or long term.”30 
The evaluation of disability is frequently done on a case-by-case basis 
because symptoms of some disabilities and illnesses can vary widely.31 
In contrast, the discrimination provision of Title VII applies to “any 
individual” who is discriminated against “because of such individual’s 
 
 25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (2001). 
 26. Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977); see also Karlan & Rutherglen, 
supra note 24, at 7. 
 27. Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 24, at 8. The ADA’s definition of reasonable 
accommodation indicates its potentially extensive scope: 
The term “reasonable accommodation” may include— 
(A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities; and 
(B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant 
position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or 
modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified 
readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with 
disabilities. 
42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) (2001). 
 28. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2001). 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2001). 
 30. Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
 31. Id.at 199. 
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”32 While evidence and 
analysis is needed to establish disability for ADA claims, whether an 
individual falls under one of the five protected classes under Title VII is 
usually self-evident. 
There also are important similarities, particularly in the provisions 
relevant to claims of harassment, between the two statutes. According to 
the EEOC,33 Title VII § 703(a)(1) expressly proscribes sexual 
harassment, stating: “It shall be unlawful employment practice for an 
employer – to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because 
of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”34 
The prohibition of discrimination in Title I of the ADA utilizes 
similar language: “No covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such 
individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, 
advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job 
training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.”35 
Given these important textual similarities between Title VII and the 
ADA, it is useful to evaluate the way these statutes are applied by the 
courts. 
B. Types of Employment Discrimination Claims Available Under Title 
VII 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides statutory authority 
to support several types of employment discrimination claims. One claim 
supported by Title VII is that of invidious discrimination because of race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin—the five characteristics covered 
by the Act—as shown through direct evidence.36 Direct evidence can be 
particularly effective in convincing the fact finder that discrimination 
occurred; this method of proof is not frequently used, however, because 
employee-plaintiffs rarely have such evidence to present.37 
 
 32. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001). 
 33. Policy Guidance on Current Issues of Sexual Harassment, Notice 915-050 (Equal Emp. 
Opp. Comm’n Mar. 19, 1990), available at U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPP. COMM’N, SEX DISCRIMINATION 
ISSUES: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION PROHIBITED BY TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 
1964, AS AMENDED AND THE EQUAL PAY ACT OF 1963, C-1 (1996) [hereinafter SEX 
DISCRIMINATION]. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2001). 
 36. Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 670 (1989). 
 37. Id. 
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In 1971, the United States Supreme Court confirmed the availability 
of a second type of claim under Title VII, a claim of discrimination 
shown through disparate impact.38 In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,39 a 
group of “incumbent Negro employees” working at a power-generating 
facility challenged the validity of the employer requiring a high-school 
degree or passage of a standardized general intelligence test in order to 
receive employment.40 Under a disparate impact theory recognized in 
Griggs, an employer is proscribed from implementing practices that are 
facially fair but discriminatory in effect, regardless of the employer’s 
intent, unless the practice is sufficiently related to business necessity.41 
Only two years later, the Supreme Court explained a third claim 
under Title VII, proof of discrimination through individual disparate 
treatment.42 In McDonnell Douglas v. Green,43 the respondent, an 
African-American civil-rights activist, following his participation in a 
“lock-in” protest, claimed that his discharge was racially motivated 
rather than a part of a general work force reduction as claimed by the 
employer.44 The Court developed a burden-shifting analysis for use in 
analyzing disparate treatment claims: first, the complainant faces a 
burden of proving a prima facie case of racial discrimination;45 if met, 
the burden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory justification for the challenged action; if met, the 
burden finally shifts back to the complainant to demonstrate that the 
employer’s justification is only a pretext for unlawful discrimination.46 
 
 38. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-33 (1971). 
 39. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 40. Id. at 425-26. 
 41. Id. at 431-32. The statutory authority for disparate impact claims under Title VII is found 
in Section 703(a)(2) which prohibits employers from: “limit[ing], segregat[ing], or classify[ing] 
[their] employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual or employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) 
(2001). 
 42. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 807 (1973). 
 43. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 44. Id. at 794-95. 
 45. The Court outlined four steps to establishing a prima facie case of discrimination 
appropriate under the facts: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant’s qualifications. 
Id. at 802. The Court also noted that differing factual situations may demand alterations to this test. 
Id. at 802 n.13. 
 46. Id. at 802-04. The statutory authority for disparate treatment claims under Title VII is 
found in Section 703(a)(1) which makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to 
discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
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Around the time of these landmark Supreme Court cases, lower 
federal courts were laying the foundation for a fourth type of claim under 
Title VII, harassment.47 While these examples of early cases concerned 
race and religion, there since has been much greater development of 
harassment claims through claims of sexual harassment. There are two 
recognized types of harassment prohibited under Title VII: quid pro quo 
harassment and hostile work environment harassment.48 Quid pro quo 
harassment exists when “submission to or rejection of such conduct by 
an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting 
such individual.”49 In contrast, hostile work environment harassment is 
present when “unwelcome sexual conduct . . . ‘unreasonably interfer[es] 
with an individual’s job performance’ or creates an ‘intimidating, hostile, 
or offensive working environment’ . . . even if it leads to no tangible or 
economic job consequences.”50 The Supreme Court in Meritor Savings 
Bank v. Vinson51 confirmed that both types of harassment are prohibited 
by Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII.52 
Finally, Title VII also supports retaliation claims.53 In order to 
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must establish 
three elements: first, that she was participating in a “statutorily protected 
activity;” second, that the employer made an adverse employment 
decision against her; and finally, that the first two elements are causally 
linked.54 
C. Types of Employment Discrimination Claims Available Under the 
ADA 
Several of these Title VII concepts are present in ADA analysis. 
Although a complex statute, Title I of the ADA can be best summarized 
 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, 
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001). 
 47. See, e.g., Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 
(1972) (holding that a hostile work environment because of race violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title 
VII); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 161 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (finding that a hostile work 
environment because of religion violated Section 703(a)(1) of Title VII). 
 48. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-2. 
 49. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (2002)). For case law examples of quid pro quo 
harassment, see, e.g., Miller v. Bank of Am., 600 F.2d 211, 212 (9th Cir. 1979) (alleging plaintiff 
was terminated when she refused to accept her supervisor’s sexual advances); Barnes v. Costle, 561 
F.2d 983, 984-85 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (alleging plaintiff’s job was eradicated after she refused to 
cooperate with her supervisor’s sexual advances). 
 50. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 30, at C-2 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (2002)). 
 51. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 52. Id. at 65-66. For the text of Section 703(a)(1), see supra note 46. 
 53. See, e.g., Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d 446, 452 (D.C. Cir. 1999). 
 54. Id. 
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as prohibiting employment discrimination against people with disabilities 
and affirmatively requiring employers to provide disabled people with 
reasonable accommodations when providing such accommodation would 
not pose an undue hardship on the business.55 Following a general 
proscription of discrimination, Title I lists seven examples of actions that 
are included in the definition of “discrimination,” none of which 
explicitly mention harassment.56 Therefore, there is no explicit textual 
reference to disability harassment as a prohibited form of discrimination. 
 
 55. DAVID WOLOWITZ & MICHAEL O’CONNOR, THE GUIDEBOOK OF LAWS AND PROGRAMS 
FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES, 6-1-1, 6-1-3 (2000). 
 56. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1) – (7) (2001). These provisions in full indicate that 
“discrimination” includes: 
(1) limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee in a way that 
adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or employee because of the 
disability of such applicant or employee; 
(2) participating in a contractual or other arrangement or relationship that has the effect of 
subjecting a covered entity’s qualified applicant or employee with a disability to the 
discrimination prohibited by this subchapter (such relationship includes a relationship 
with an employment or referral agency, labor union, an organization providing fringe 
benefits to an employee of the covered entity, or an organization providing training and 
apprenticeship programs); 
(3) utilizing standards, criteria, or methods of administration – 
that have the effect of discrimination on the basis of disability; or 
that perpetuate the discrimination of others who are subject to common administrative 
control; 
(4) excluding or otherwise denying equal jobs or benefits to a qualified individual 
because of the known disability of an individual with whom the qualified individual is 
known to have a relationship or association; 
(A) not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations 
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, 
unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an 
undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity; or 
(B) denying employment opportunities to a job applicant or employee who is an 
otherwise qualified individual with a disability, if such denial is based on the need of 
such covered entity to made reasonable accommodation to the physical or mental 
impairments of the employee or applicant; 
(6) using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen 
out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with 
disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered 
entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with 
business necessity; and 
(7) failing to select and administer tests concerning employment in the most effective 
manner to ensure that, when such test is administered to a job applicant or employee who 
has a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, such test results 
accurately reflect the skills, aptitude, or whatever other factor of such applicant or 
employee that such test purports to measure, rather than reflecting the impaired sensory, 
manual, or speaking skills of such employee or applicant (except where such skills are 
the factors that the test purports to measure). 
Id. 
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The EEOC, in interpreting the ADA and providing guidance on ADA 
enforcement, has expanded this list slightly.57 
However, this statutory subsection does not purport to present an all-
inclusive list of forms of discrimination prohibited by Title I of the ADA. 
In fact, through September 1998, the EEOC has compiled data on suits 
that reveal that 47 different types of issues have been raised under the 
ADA.58 Among these 47 issues, harassment due to disability was the 
fourth most common claim raised, totaling 6.8% of ADA charges.59 
Court analysis of claims under the ADA has often followed the Title 
VII model. In cases brought under the ADA, courts have described the 
two main routes of proof of discrimination as being through direct 
evidence and through indirect evidence. These court rulings mirror the 
Title VII dichotomy between direct evidence and disparate 
impact/disparate treatment.60 The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized 
that the ADA, like Title VII, explicitly “forbids ‘utilizing standards, 
criteria, or methods of administration’ that disparately impact the 
disabled, without regard to whether such conduct has a rational basis.”61 
The claim for retaliation under the ADA also mirrors Title VII 
precedent.62 Nevertheless, by far the greatest borrowing of the 
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting standard for disparate treatment 
claims has occurred in ADA analysis. 
 
 57. See U.S. EEOC, DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION: EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 
PROHIBITED BY THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF 1990, at I-4 (1998) [hereinafter 
DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION]. In addition to the seven examples provided in the text of the ADA, 
the EEOC also lists retaliation: “Discriminating against an individual because s/he has opposed an 
employment practice of the employer or filed a complaint, testified, assisted, or participated in an 
investigation, proceeding, or hearing to enforce provisions of the Act.” Id. Finally, and most notably 
for the purposes of this Note: “EEOC also considers ‘disability harassment’ a form of discrimination 
under the ADA.” HELPING EMPLOYERS, supra note 22, at 79. 
 58. HELPING EMPLOYERS, supra note 22, at 284-85. These issues include, in descending 
order of frequency: discharge, reasonable accommodation, terms and conditions, harassment, hiring, 
other, discipline, layoff, promotion, wages, demotion, constructive discharge, reinstatement, 
suspension, benefits, intimidation, sexual harassment, assignment, recall, benefits—insurance, 
training, union representation, prohibited medical inquiry/exam, retirement involuntary, job 
classification, references unfavorable, exclusion, benefits—retirement/pension, referral, seniority, 
qualifications, maternity, testing, tenure, record keeping violation, severance pay denied, filing EEO 
forms, apprenticeship, advertising, early retirement incentive, segregated facilities, posting notice, 
waiver of ADEA suit rights, paternity, other language/accent issue, segregated locals, English 
language only rule. Id. 
 59. Id. at 284. 
 60. See, e.g., Stone v. City of Indianapolis Pub. Utils. Div., 281 F.3d 640, 644 (7th Cir. 
2002). 
 61. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 372 (2001) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(b)(3)(A) (2001)) (emphasis added). 
 62. See, e.g., Soileau v. Guilford of Me., Inc., 105 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1997). 
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D. ADA Employment Discrimination Claims Borrowing Title VII 
Burden-Shifting Analysis 
 Almost all of the federal circuit courts of appeals have considered 
whether to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis,63 first 
developed for Title VII claims, to various ADA claims.64 Generally 
speaking, nine circuits have applied that burden-shifting analysis to 
disability discrimination claims based on disparate treatment, through 
indirect evidence.65 In addition, courts have utilized past analysis from 
Title VII retaliation claims in similar claims arising under the ADA.66 
Courts have, however, recognized that important differences between 
Title VII and the ADA render the application of Title VII analysis to 
ADA claims inappropriate in certain circumstances.67 These differences 
justify the assertion by courts that Title VII analysis cannot be 
incorporated wholesale in ADA cases.68 Where the employer has acted, 
and claims that this action was unrelated to the employee’s disability, 
application of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis is more 
appropriate.69 Title VII is based on the premise that, in most 
circumstances, it is impermissible to make employment decisions based 
on its covered factors: race, color, religion, sex, and national origin.70 In 
 
 63. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16.. 
 65. See Snead v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 237 F.3d 1080, 1093 (9th Cir. 2001); Parry v. 
Mohawk Motors of Mich., Inc., 236 F.3d 299, 310 (6th Cir. 2000); Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 
1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000); Butler v. City of Prairie Village, Kan., 172 F.3d 736, 747 (10th Cir. 
1999); Price v. S-B Power Tool, 75 F.3d 362, 364-65 (8th Cir. 1996); Daigle v. Liberty Life Ins. Co., 
70 F.3d 394, 396 (5th Cir. 1995); Newman v. GHS Osteopathic, Inc., Parkview Hosp. Div., 60 F.3d 
153, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1995); Ennis v. Nat’l Ass’n of Bus. & Educ. Radio, Inc., 53 F.3d 55, 57-58 (4th 
Cir. 1995); DeLuca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793, 797 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 66. See, e.g., Soileau, 105 F.3d at 16. 
 67. See, e.g., Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 116 F.3d 876, 885 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]here are 
significant differences between certain types of disability-based discrimination and other categories 
of employment discrimination, and thus the McDonnell Douglas framework should not be 
reflexively applied to ADA cases, but should be preceded by a careful consideration of its 
appropriateness to the particular disability discrimination claim. . . .”). For an in-depth discussion of 
this issue, see Kevin W. Williams, Note, The Reasonable Accommodation Difference: the Effect of 
Applying the Burden Shifting Frameworks Developed Under Title VII in Disparate Treatment Cases 
to Claims Brought Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 18 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 98 (1997). 
 68. See, e.g., Ennis, 53 F.3d at 59 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Although we accept the McDonnell 
Douglas framework as a useful tool, it should not be applied in a ‘rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic’ 
manner. The paradigm is merely a means to fine-tune the presentation of proof and, more 
importantly, to sharpen the focus on the ultimate question—whether the plaintiff successfully 
demonstrated that the defendant intentionally discriminated against her.” (citation omitted)). 
 69. See Aka, 116 F.3d at 886; Williams, supra note 67, at 113-14, 129-30. 
 70. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 3119-20 (“The avowed purpose of title VII of 
the bill is to eliminate . . . discrimination in employment on account of race, color, religion, sex, or 
national origin . . . .  In contrast, it would not constitute an unlawful employment practice to hire a 
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contrast, an important provision of the ADA requires employers to 
consider disability in the affirmative requirement of reasonable 
accommodation.71 Given this important distinction, most courts facing 
the issue have refused to apply the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting 
analysis to a claim regarding an employer’s failure to reasonably 
accommodate under the ADA.72 
This brief summary and comparison of the ADA and Title VII 
reveals many important parallels and differences between the language, 
purpose, and intent of the two statutes. Therefore, greater analysis of 
harassment specifically is needed to explore the suitability of a potential 
disability harassment claim. 
III. ANALYSIS 
The fact that all ADA claims have not been analyzed under Title VII 
precedent should not be determinative of the appropriateness of a 
disability harassment claim under the ADA. There are, however, 
important differences between the provisions of the ADA and of Title 
VII and important differences between the nature of each statute’s 
protected class(es). These differences should be explored in order to 
determine whether the framework used by courts in evaluating sexual 
harassment claims under Title VII can be used in the same or a modified 
form when analyzing disability harassment claims. But even before the 
legal tests are explored, these two statutes must be examined to see 
whether the intent and purpose behind each statute is sufficiently similar 
to justify the transfer of Title VII sexual harassment precedent to 
disability harassment claims. 
A. Overview of Court of Appeals & District Court Treatment of 
Disability Harassment Claims 
A useful starting point in evaluating these two statutes is to examine 
how courts have dealt with disability harassment claims so far. There has 
been a split in the way the lower courts have addressed disability 
harassment claims under the ADA. There are four general categories into 
which the federal courts fall: 1) expressly holding that a claim for 
 
person of a particular religion, sex, or national origin in those limited circumstances where religion, 
sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification.”) (emphasis added). 
 71. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5) (2000). For full text of this provision, see supra note 56. 
 72. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 264 (1st Cir. 1999); 
Bultemeyer v. Fort Wayne Cmty. Sch., 100 F.3d 1281, 1283 (7th Cir. 1996); but see Benson v. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1112 (8th Cir. 1995) (applying a modified burden-shifting 
analysis to a failure to reasonably accommodate claim). 
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disability harassment exists under the ADA;73 2) assuming without 
deciding that such a claim exists, then denying the claim for insufficient 
evidence;74 3) considering such a claim without expressly discussing 
whether such a claim exists, then denying the claim for insufficient 
evidence;75 and 4) as yet having no published opinions on point.76 Each 
category will be considered briefly in turn below. 
1. Courts expressly holding that a claim for disability harassment exists 
under the ADA 
Very recently and very notably, two federal circuit courts expressly 
held that disability harassment claims are cognizable under the ADA.77 
Prior to these two cases, the federal circuit courts of appeals had avoided 
the issue.78 In contrast, the federal district courts, from a variety of 
jurisdictions, have expressly held that disability harassment claims are 
cognizable under the ADA on numerous occasions.79 Both federal circuit 
courts of appeals cases include reasoned analysis to justify their 
holdings. 
In Fox v. General. Motors Corp.,80 plaintiff Robert Fox was 
restricted by his doctor to “light-duty work” because of his non-work 
related back injury for his job at a General Motors plant.81 Fox 
encountered resentment and complaints about his requests for 
accommodations in compliance with his doctor’s recommendation.82 For 
example, although Fox could complete several jobs within his 
department, his general foreman kept assigning him to jobs he could not 
do. The foreman also made derogatory comments about Fox.83 
 
 73. See infra notes 77-95 and accompanying text. 
 74. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
 75. See infra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
 76. See infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text. 
 77. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 78. See infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
 79. See, e.g., Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 536 (N.D. Tex. 2001) 
(following Flowers in expressly recognizing disability harassment as a cognizable claim); Vendetta 
v. Bell Atl. Corp., No. CIV.A.97-4838, 1998 WL 575111, at *9 (E.D. Pa. 1998); Hendler v. 
Intelecom U.S.A., Inc., 963 F. Supp. 200, 208 (E.D. N.Y. 1997); Chua v. St. Paul Fed. Bank for 
Sav., 1996 WL 312079, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 1996); Haysman v. Food Lion, Inc., 893 F. Supp. 1092, 
1108-09 (S.D. Ga. 1995); Mannell v. Am. Tobacco Co., 871 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D. Va. 1994); 
Davis v. York Int’l Inc., 1993 WL 524761, at *9 (D. Md. 1993). 
 80. 247 F.3d 169 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 81. Id. at 172-73. 
 82. Id. at 173. 
 83. Id. For example, when Fox told his supervisor he could not do a certain task because of 
his medical limitations, his supervisor responded, “I don’t need any of you handicapped M——-F—
——’s. As far as I am concerned, you can go the H—- home.” Id. According to Fox, similar verbal 
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The Fourth Circuit began its analysis by responding to defendant’s 
contention that disability harassment is not a cognizable claim under the 
ADA.84 The court first noted that the Supreme Court recognized a hostile 
work environment claim under the proscription of discrimination in Title 
VII based on very similar language to the “terms, conditions, and 
privileges of employment” language of the ADA.85 Because this 
language had been interpreted by the Supreme Court in this way under 
Title VII prior to the enactment of the ADA, the court assumed that the 
use of almost identical language in the ADA demonstrated a 
congressional intent to include a parallel harassment claim under the 
ADA.86 Finally, the court noted the similarity in purpose between the two 
statutes and the examples of courts borrowing Title VII analysis with 
reference to ADA claims as further support for the holding.87 
In Flowers v. South. Regional Physician Services. Inc.,88 the Fifth 
Circuit similarly held that a disability harassment claim is actionable 
under the ADA almost contemporaneously with the Fox case.89 In 
Flowers, plaintiff Sandra Flowers worked as a medical assistant.90 In 
March 1995, Flowers’ supervisor learned that she was HIV positive; she 
was terminated in November 1995.91 In a charge filed with the EEOC, 
Flowers alleged that she was terminated because of her disability and 
that she was subject to harassing actions meant to either encourage her to 
resign or to cast her “in a false light” for the purpose of terminating her.92 
In addressing the existence of a disability harassment claim under the 
ADA, the Fifth Circuit first acknowledged that other circuits have denied 
such claims, usually after assuming without deciding that such a claim is 
actionable.93 The Flowers court, like the Fox court, noted that the 
 
harassment occurred on a “constant” basis, from several co-workers as well as his supervisor. Id. at 
174. 
 84. Id. at 175-76. 
 85. Id. at 175. 
 86. Id. For examples of this interpretation by the Supreme Court, see Harris v. Forklift Sys., 
Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993); and Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64-66 (1986). The ADA 
proscribes discrimination as to “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment,” 42 U.S.C. § 
12112(a) (2001) (emphasis added), while the Title VII prohibits discrimination as to “terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2001) (emphasis added). 
 87. Fox, 247 F.3d at 176; see also supra notes 16-17, 63-64 and accompanying text. 
 88. 247 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2001). 
 89. Flowers,247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001). The Flowers case was decided March 30, 
2001. Id. at 229. The Fox case was decided April 13, 2001. Fox, 247 F.3d at 169. 
 90. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 231. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 231-32. 
 93. Id. at 232-33. The court characterizes the Sixth Circuit’s analysis in Keever v. 
Middletown, 145 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998), as “implicitly” recognizing such a claim “albeit with no 
analysis.” Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233 n.2; see also infra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
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virtually identical statutory provision concerning terms, conditions and 
privileges justified a consistent application of these provisions through 
recognizing a disability harassment claim under basic principles of 
statutory interpretation.94 In addition, the court pointed to holdings of 
federal district courts recognizing the claim as well as the similarity in 
purpose and remedial framework between the ADA and Title VII as 
further support that disability harassment is a cognizable claim under the 
ADA.95 
2. Courts assuming without deciding that a disability harassment claim 
exists, then denying the claim for insufficient evidence 
Several circuit courts of appeals have taken this second approach to 
disability harassment claims, including the Third, Seventh, Tenth, and 
perhaps Eighth Circuits.96 For example, in Walton v. Mental Health 
Ass’n of South East Pennsylvania.,97 plaintiff Sandra Walton worked for 
defendant, an advocacy organization for people with mental illnesses; 
Walton herself suffered from the disability of depression.98 Walton 
alleged that certain comments and actions by her supervisor constituted 
harassment, including, for example, repeated phone calls while Walton 
was hospitalized inquiring when she would return to work.99 
In analyzing whether to recognize a disability harassment claim 
under the ADA, the Third Circuit first noted that the ADA contains 
language almost identical to that which the Supreme Court has held 
supports a hostile work environment claim under Title VII.100 The court 
went on to describe the standard that would apply to such a claim, 
mirroring the Title VII standard.101 Applying this standard, the court 
deduced that a reasonable jury could not find that harassment had taken 
 
 94. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 233; see also supra note 83. 
 95. Flowers, 247 F.3d at 234-35; see also supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 96. See, e.g., Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1253 (10th Cir. 2001); Vollmert v. Wis. 
Dep’t of Transp., 197 F.3d 293, 297 (7th Cir. 1999); Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 
F.3d 661, 666-67 (3d Cir. 1999); Moritz v. Frontier Airlines, Inc., 147 F.3d 784, 788 (8th Cir. 1998). 
The position of the Eighth Circuit is unclear, or perhaps inconsistent, as noted by other courts. The 
Seventh Circuit notes that the 1998 Moritz case, cited above, assumes without deciding that a 
disability harassment claim exists, and then denies the claim on the merits. Silk v. City of Chicago, 
194 F.3d 788, 803-804 & n.15 (7th Cir. 1999). However, the Silk court also points to the Eighth 
Circuit’s 1998 Cody case, see infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text, as an example of a case in 
which a court recognizes a disability harassment claim, “without discussion,” before affirming 
summary judgment for the employer. Silk, 194 F.3d at 803 & n.14. 
 97. 168 F.3d 661 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 98. Id. at 664. 
 99. Id. at 667 & n.4. 
 100. Id. at 666; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 101. Walton, 168 F.3d at 667. 
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place.  Therefore, the court chose to assume without deciding that such a 
claim could exist.102 This case is representative of other federal circuit 
courts of appeals cases within this category.103 
3. Courts considering a disability harassment claim without expressly 
deciding whether such a claim exists, then denying the claim for 
insufficient evidence 
Two circuits, the Sixth and perhaps the Eighth, fall into this third 
category of approaches to disability harassment claims.104 In Keever v. 
City of Middletown,105 the Sixth Circuit, within a single paragraph, 
mentions the alleged disability harassment claim denied below upon 
motion for summary judgment, and affirms this denial with no discussion 
of whether such a claim is cognizable under the ADA.106 
While the Eighth Circuit analyzed the disability harassment claim in 
more depth than the Sixth Circuit did in the Keever case, the Eighth 
Circuit similarly skipped the step of justifying the existence of such a 
claim in Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc.107 The court simply 
stated: “The ADA prohibits employment discrimination against a 
qualified individual because of a disability. (citation omitted) In all 
constructive discharge and harassment cases under the ADA . . . the 
plaintiff must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination or face 
dismissal of her claim.”108 
Perhaps it is inaccurate to conclude that these two decisions 
constitute an additional category of analysis of disability harassment 
claims independent of the second category, assuming such a claim exists 
without so deciding because of insufficient evidence to succeed on the 
claim. After all, three years after the Cody and Keever cases, the Tenth 
Circuit contended: “No federal appellate court has yet directly ruled on 
whether a hostile work environment claim can even be brought under the 
ADA.”109 However these two cases should be interpreted, they certainly 
 
 102. Id. at 666-67. 
 103. See supra note 96 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra and infra notes 96, 105-10 and accompanying text. 
 105. 145 F.3d 809 (6th Cir. 1998). 
 106. Id. at 813. The analysis of the disability harassment claim, in its entirety: “Keever has 
failed to establish any facts concerning whether the harassment he claims took place was severe 
enough to create an objectively hostile work environment. Conversations between an employee and 
his superiors about his performance does not constitute harassment simply because they cause the 
employee distress.” Id. For another court’s interpretation of this case, see infra note 106 and 
accompanying text. 
 107. Cody v. Cigna Healthcare of St. Louis, Inc., 139 F.3d 595, 598 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 108. Id. (citations omitted). 
 109. Steele v. Thiokol Corp., 241 F.3d 1248, 1252 (10th Cir. 2001). This statement is not 
inconsistent with the Fox and Flowers cases, see supra notes 77-92 and accompanying text, because 
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fall short of explicit recognition of a disability harassment claim under 
the ADA comparable to that in the Fox and Flowers cases,110 and thus 
are less significant in the determination of whether such a claim should 
in fact exist. 
4. Courts having no published opinions about disability harassment 
Five circuits, including the First, Second, Ninth, Eleventh, and D.C. 
Circuits, fall into this final category.111 While such a category at first 
glance seems uninformative, there may be more to the story than the 
simple fact that such claims have not been raised yet in these 
jurisdictions.112 
One reason for the lack of precedent in these jurisdictions is that 
many disability harassment claims have been dismissed for procedural 
reasons,113 and so presumably are not published because they would add 
little to the body of law. But even more interesting is a second reason: 
cases addressing the cognizance of a disability harassment claim may not 
be selected for publication so that the decisions lack binding force and 
need not be reconciled with other unpublished cases.114 Of course it is 
impossible to discern conclusively the motivations behind these 
publication decisions. 
Nonetheless, an interesting characteristic should be noted among 
unpublished decisions addressing disability harassment claims under the 
ADA in the Ninth Circuit. For example, two cases in this jurisdiction fall 
into the second category115 described above in that they assume without 
deciding that such a claim exists and then deny the claim given 
insufficient evidence.116 Another case, in contrast, would belong in the 
third category117 described above because it never justifies or explains 
the existence of a disability harassment claim under the ADA but then 
 
the Steele case came down in February 2001, while the Fox and Flowers cases came down in April 
and March 2001, respectively. 
 110. See supra notes 77, 80-95 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 112-20 and accompanying text. 
 112. There is likely more to the story given the frequency with which disability harassment 
claims are raised. See supra note 59 and accompanying text. 
 113. See, e.g., Giardina v. Healthnow New York, Inc., No. 00-7196, 2000 WL 1370316, at *1 
(2d Cir.) (unpublished decision) (affirming that the disability harassment claim would not be 
considered on appeal because it was time-barred). 
 114. See, e.g., FED. CL. CT. R. 52(a); D.C. CIR. R. 28(c); 7TH CIR. R. 53(b)(2)(iv); 9TH CIR. R. 
36-3(a); 10TH CIR. R. 36.3(A); 11TH CIR. R. 36-2. 
 115. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text. 
 116. Vawser v. Fred Meyer, Inc., No. 00-36081, 2001 WL 1174084, at *2 (9th Cir.) 
(unpublished decision); Baumgart v. Washington, No. 98-35172, 1999 WL 535795, at *1 (9th Cir.) 
(unpublished decision). 
 117. See supra notes 104-10 and accompanying text. 
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denies the claim due to inadequate evidence.118 This apparent 
inconsistency, coupled with the failure to publish any of these decisions, 
perhaps reflects the inability or the unwillingness of the Ninth Circuit to 
take a definitive stance on the issue of the cognizance of a disability 
harassment claim under the ADA.119 The example of the Ninth Circuit is 
a microcosm of the hesitance and inconsistency among all but two of the 
federal circuit courts of appeals as to whether a disability harassment 
claim exists under the ADA.120 
B. Is a Disability Harassment Claim Appropriate: ADA Language and 
Background 
Several factors indicate the appropriateness of interpreting that a 
harassment claim exists under the ADA. In 1993, the EEOC attempted to 
facilitate a unified policy governing harassment based on “race, color, 
religion, gender (excluding harassment that is sexual in nature, which is 
covered by the Commission’s Guidelines on Discrimination Because of 
Sex), national origin, age, or disability” through proposed rules.121 These 
 
 118. Williams v. Boeing Co. No. 97-36098, 1999 WL 50882, at *2 (9th Cir.) (unpublished 
decision). 
 119. Such hesitance or indecisiveness contrasts sharply with the Fourth Circuit’s clear and 
definitive stance: “[W]e have little difficulty in concluding that the ADA, like Title VII, creates a 
cause of action for hostile work environment harassment.” Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 
176 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 120. The Fourth and Fifth Circuits explicitly recognized a disability harassment claim under 
the ADA. See supra notes 80-95 and accompanying text. 
 121. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, 
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (proposed October 1, 1993) (to have been codified at 29 
C.F.R. pt. 1609). The proposed guidelines provided in relevant part: 
  (a) Harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or 
disability constitutes discrimination in the terms, conditions, and privileges of 
employment and, as such, violates title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 
42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. (title VII); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, as 
amended, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. (ADEA); the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 
12101 et seq. (ADA); or the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. 701 et 
seq., as applicable. 
  (b)(1) Harassment is verbal or physical conduct that denigrates or shows hostility or 
aversion toward an individual because of his/her race, color, religion, gender, national 
origin, age, or disability, or that of his/her relatives, friends, or associates, and that: 
  (i) Has the purpose or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work 
environment; 
  (ii) Has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual’s work 
performance; or 
  (iii) Otherwise adversely affects an individual’s employment opportunities. 
. . . (c) The standard for determining whether verbal or physical conduct relating to race, 
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability is sufficiently severe or 
pervasive to create a hostile or abusive work environment is whether a reasonable person 
in the same or similar circumstances would find the conduct intimidating, hostile, or 
abusive. The “reasonable person” standard includes consideration of the perspective of 
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rules were heavily influenced by sexual harassment precedent, and 
sought to apply this framework to several characteristics including 
disability.122 Because these rules were never finalized, we are left with 
the guidelines concerning sexual harassment and less frequent case law 
and guidelines addressing harassment because of other characteristics.123 
Nonetheless, these EEOC Proposed Guidelines demonstrate the fact that 
the EEOC interprets harassment to violate the discrimination prohibitions 
of both Title VII and the ADA because the protected classes of both 
statutes are included within the same Guidelines.124 
Second, there are many important parallels between the two statutes. 
The primary provisions prohibiting discrimination are virtually 
identical.125 The ADA adopts the powers, remedies, and procedures 
provisions of Title VII as its enforcement provisions.126 The ADA 
incorporates by reference the definitions of “employee” and “employer” 
from Title VII.127 In addition, the principle purposes of the two statutes 
are very similar.128 The federal regulations promulgated to interpret and 
effectuate the ADA also acknowledge the commonality of these two 
statutes by saying: “Like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibits 
discrimination on the bases of race, color, religion, national origin, and 
sex, the ADA seeks to ensure access to equal employment opportunities 
based on merit.”129 These factors indicate that the purposes and intent 
between the two statutes are so similar that the harassment claim already 
recognized under Title VII should be similarly adopted under the ADA. 
C. Development & Purposes of Sexual Harassment Claim Under Title 
VII 
While theoretically there should be a harassment claim under both 
statutes, harassment under Title VII must be examined in greater detail in 
order to determine whether it is practicable to transfer Title VII 
harassment analysis to claims brought under the ADA. As noted above, 
 
persons of the alleged victim’s race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or 
disability. It is not necessary to make an additional showing of psychological harm. 
Id. at 51,268-69. For additional analysis of the significance of these proposed guidelines, see 
Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1500-02. 
 122. Ravitch, supra note 13 at 1501. 
 123. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1606.8 (2001) (national origin harassment); supra note 6 and 
accompanying text. 
 124. Ravitch, supra note 13 at 1502. 
 125. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 126. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. 
 127. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 128. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 129. 29 C.F.R. § 1630, app. (2002). 
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Title VII harassment claims originated with reference to race and religion 
but there is the possibility of harassment claims under Title VII based on 
any of the five protected classes.130 Therefore, while it is important to 
note that harassment claims can be based on several classes, what 
follows is an examination of sexual harassment as an example of 
harassment analysis under Title VII.131 
In the landmark case of Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,132 the 
Supreme Court recognized the existence of both quid pro quo and hostile 
work environment harassment claims under Section 703(a)(1) of Title 
VII.133 The hostile work environment harassment claim is the type that is 
potentially applicable to disability harassment claims. Hostile work 
environment harassment is present when “unwelcome sexual conduct . . . 
‘unreasonably interfer[es] with an individual’s job performance’ or 
creates an ‘intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment’ . . . 
even if it leads to no tangible or economic job consequences.”134 The 
Vinson court explained that in order to constitute a statutory violation, 
the harassment must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the 
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working 
environment.”135 
The EEOC further clarified this holding by outlining factors that are 
relevant in an evaluation of whether an environment is “hostile”: whether 
the acts were verbal or physical, or both; the frequency of the conduct; 
whether the acts were “hostile and patently offensive”; whether the 
accused harasser was a co-worker or a supervisor; whether others 
participated in the harassing; and whether the acts were directed at more 
than one person.136 
Another important component of a sexual harassment claim is the 
determination of whether the claimed sexual advances were 
 
 130. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 131. Sexual harassment was chosen for this part of the analysis because the majority of hostile 
work environment harassment cases brought under Title VII involve discrimination based on sex. 
Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 580. For the more general discussion of harassment under Title VII, see 
supra notes 47-52. 
 132. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
 133. Id. at 65-66. For the text of Section 703(a)(1), see supra note 46. See also supra and infra 
notes 49 & 142 and accompanying text for a brief explanation of quid pro quo harassment. 
 134. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-2 (1996) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3)). 
 135. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th 
Cir. 1982)). 
 136. SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-14 (1996). The Supreme Court commented on 
the EEOC’s guidance in this area and described relevant factors in the determination of hostility 
slightly differently. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993) (“[T]he frequency of the 
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere 
offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”) 
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“unwelcome.”137 The Court and the EEOC have recognized that this 
inquiry is often difficult to prove because it is heavily tied to questions of 
credibility.138 The Court emphasizes that the proper inquiry is about 
unwelcomeness rather than about voluntariness of participation in 
alleged sexual interaction.139 The EEOC further explains that while each 
case is evaluated as to unwelcomeness through a case-by-case 
investigation of the totality of the circumstances, the existence of a 
contemporaneous complaint is relevant but not determinative.140 
This case law precedent resembles the federal regulations concerning 
sexual harassment. These regulations generally define harassment that is 
in violation of Title VII as, “[u]nwelcome sexual advances, requests for 
sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature”.141 
Such occurrences are considered sexual harassment when one of three 
conditions are met: (1) participation in such acts becomes a term or 
condition of an employee’s job (quid pro quo); (2) participation or 
refusal to participate in such conduct is the reason behind employment 
decisions having an impact on the employee (quid pro quo); or (3) this 
conduct unreasonably intrudes into the employee’s job performance or 
causes a hostile work environment.142 The regulations also specify that 
the EEOC should evaluate charges on a case-by-case basis under a 
totality of the circumstances.143 
The Supreme Court elaborated further on the character of the proper 
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim in the 1993 case, 
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.144 While first reaffirming the standard 
laid out in Vinson, the Court further explained that the standard has both 
an objective and a subjective component.145 More specifically, both a 
reasonable person and the victim must consider the environment to be 
hostile or abusive.146 Finally, there need not be proof of “concrete 
psychological harm” in order to establish a violation so long as the 
objective and subjective perception requirements are satisfied.147 These 
Supreme Court precedents, federal regulations, and additional EEOC 
 
 137. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (2002) (concerning sexual harassment). 
 138. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68; SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33 at C-7 to C-
13. 
 139. See Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 68. 
 140. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-7 to C-10. 
 141. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a). 
 142. Id. 
 143. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (2002). 
 144. 510 U.S. 17 (1993). 
 145. Id. at 21. 
 146. Id. at 21-22. 
 147. Id. at 22; Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., Notice 915.002 (Equal 
Emp. Opp. Comm’n Mar. 8, 1994), available at SEX DISCRIMINATION supra note 33, at D-1 (1996). 
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guidance constitute the body of law that may be adopted, in whole or in 
part, for the evaluation of allegations of disability harassment claims 
under the ADA. 
D. Does the Sexual Harassment Framework of Title VII Fit into the 
ADA? 
Because of some important differences between Title VII and the 
ADA, specifically the differences between disability and the five 
characteristics protected under Title VII, the analysis of sexual 
harassment claims cannot be wholly adopted for disability harassment 
claims.148 Nonetheless, a large portion of the analysis is relevant and 
appropriate. 
Obviously the core of a hostile work environment claim, due to 
discrimination based on sex or disability, is the frequency and 
offensiveness of the hostility. Therefore, the EEOC factors149 can be 
directly transferred to evaluate whether the conduct was sufficiently 
hostile to constitute illegal behavior in the disability context. More 
specifically, the factors can be used to evaluate whether the conduct is 
verbal or physical and whether the frequency of the conduct would affect 
the severity of the alleged hostile work environment.150 Similarly, the 
factors can be used to evaluate whether the conduct is offensive and 
whether the perpetrator is a co-worker or a superior influences the impact 
of it.151 Finally, the number of alleged harassers and alleged victims 
alters the harshness of the work environment.152 
However, two aspects of the hostile work environment analysis do 
not transfer so cleanly from sexual harassment to disability harassment—
the unwelcomeness of the conduct and the dual objective and subjective 
components of the evaluation of hostility. First, the Vinson court noted 
the necessity of investigating whether participation in the sexual conduct 
was voluntary or unwelcome.153 Inherent in this evaluation is the 
recognition that in some instances, the sexual conduct is consensual for 
some though others might consider it harassing. In contrast, it is hard to 
imagine disability harassment as ever being welcome in a comparable 
way. Nonetheless, this inconsistency in the contexts of sexual harassment 
 
 148. For a discussion of the different visions of equality and discrimination of the ADA and 
Title VII due to the differences between the protected classes of each statute, see Eichhorn, supra 
note 6, at 590-95. 
 149. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 150. See SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 33, at C-14 (1996). 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. 
 153. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). 
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and disability harassment does not frustrate the issue of how disability 
harassment claims should be analyzed. In fact, it merely demonstrates 
that an inquiry into unwelcomeness can either simply be removed from 
the analysis or summarily addressed in the evaluation of disability 
harassment. 
The Harris court clarified sexual harassment analysis further by 
emphasizing that evaluation of the hostility of the work environment 
should involve both objective and subjective components.154 Such 
consideration is appropriately applied to disability harassment claims as 
well because an objective component can help encourage some 
uniformity in the disposition of these cases and because a subjective 
component is necessary to account for the fact that a person with a 
disability may react to a work environment differently than the average 
reasonable person as envisioned by the courts.155 Evaluation of this 
component, however, will be different than in the Title VII context 
because of the affirmative requirement of reasonable accommodation.156 
Given this affirmative duty, in some instances failure to accommodate – 
the lack of action – may contribute to harassment.157 The assessment of 
lack of action as potential harassment is wholly inapplicable in the sexual 
harassment context. 
Finally, it should again be noted that while gender is self-evident, 
claims of any kind raised under the ADA must first include evaluation of 
whether the claimant is a “qualified individual with a disability” as 
defined by the ADA.158 Therefore, any claim for disability harassment 
should begin with an investigation of whether the claimant meets the 
statutory definition of disability.159 Even if the claimant is adjudicated to 
be a qualified person with a disability, some cases may be complicated 
by the difficulty of proving that the alleged harasser had knowledge of 
the claimant’s disability and that the disability was the reason behind the 
harassment.160 
 
 154. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). 
 155. That said, the premise that people with disabilities are different from the generic 
“reasonable person” reflects a societal marginalization of the people that civil rights statutes are 
designed to protect. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 622. This issue is discussed further in the Resolution 
section. See infra notes 190-93, 209-10 and accompanying text. 
 156. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 157. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 632; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1512. 
 158. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (2001). For the full text of this ADA provision, see supra note 28 
and accompanying text. 
 159. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503. 
 160. Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 624. 
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E. How Courts Have Analyzed Disability Harassment Claims So Far 
While the courts have not been consistent in discussing the existence 
of a disability harassment claim under the ADA,161 they have been 
unified in their proposal of how such a claim would be analyzed. The 
courts, “[a]ppropriately modifying the parallel Title VII 
methodology,”162 specify a multi-part analysis. In order to prove 
disability harassment the claimant must show that: 
(1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was subjected to 
unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on his disability; 
(4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter a term, 
condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) some factual basis exists 
to impute liability for the harassment to the employer.163 
Some courts elaborate on this test by recognizing the applicability of 
other components of harassment framework from the sexual harassment 
context. However, neither Fox nor Flowers, the only two circuit court 
cases officially adopting a disability harassment claim,164 discussed 
including a subjective and objective component in evaluation.165 Such 
consideration can easily be incorporated within the determination of the 
“unwelcomeness” of harassment under the second prong of the test. 
Other than that omission, the other aspects of the sexual harassment 
analysis discussed above are explicitly or implicitly contained within this 
disability harassment standard: the determination of disability166 is 
explicitly in the first prong; the unwelcomeness167 is explicitly in the 
third prong; and the EEOC factors168 can be used to evaluate the severity 
and pervasiveness of harassment under the fourth prong. Therefore, 
proposals of analysis of disability harassment by courts so far have been 
appropriately adjusted to consider the unique aspects of the ADA and 
disability compared to Title VII. 
Finally, it should be noted that, like other employment discrimination 
claims, a disability harassment claim must be specifically alleged in the 
claimant’s discrimination charge filed with the EEOC.169 Omission of the 
 
 161. See supra Part III.A. 
 162. Fox v. Gen. Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 177 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 163. Id.; see also Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 
1999); McConathy v. Dr. Pepper/Seven Up Corp., 131 F.3d 558, 563 (5th Cir. 1998). 
 164. See supra notes 77, 80-95 and accompanying text. 
 165. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. 
 166. See supra note 158 and accompanying text. 
 167. See supra notes 137-38, 140 and accompanying text. 
 168. See supra note 136 and accompanying text. 
 169. Kells v. Sinclair Buick—GMC Truck, Inc., 210 F.3d 827, 836-37 (8th Cir. 2000); Dunn 
v. WGCI AM/FM Radio, 1998 WL 182516, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 16, 1998). 
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claim in the charge indicates failure to exhaust administrative remedies 
and dismissal or summary judgment is appropriate.170 
IV. RESOLUTION 
If and when the courts consistently recognize that a disability 
harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA, the courts will face the 
challenge of deciding how such claims should be evaluated. Rather than 
force Title VII harassment analysis wholesale onto these claims, courts 
should consider the merits and weaknesses of suggestions debated in the 
sexual harassment context, namely applying a reasonable woman or 
reasonable victim standard.  By acknowledging the similarities and 
differences between the sexual harassment and disability harassment 
contexts, the courts can build an appropriate solution upon the 
foundation laid by Title VII jurisprudence. 
A. Disability Harassment Claims Should Be Cognizable Under the ADA 
Surely, the many similarities between the ADA and Title VII 
encourage courts to find that a disability harassment claim exists under 
the ADA just as courts have already clearly recognized a harassment 
claim under Title VII. The purposes of the statutes,171 the statutory 
language prohibiting discrimination,172 similar comments in the 
legislative history of the statutes,173 and legal commentary on this issue174 
all support the recognition of a disability harassment cause of action. 
Indeed, while there is confusion among the federal courts about exactly 
how to respond to such claims,175 no federal court has expressly denied 
this claim.176 Therefore, a disability harassment claim should clearly lie 
under the ADA. Hopefully other courts will follow the lead of the Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits, which in 2001 explicitly recognized that a disability 
harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA.177 
 After courts acknowledge disability harassment claims, inevitably 
the next step is resolving the controversy in defining exactly how such a 
claim should be evaluated. While courts that have addressed the issue 
have begun the process of adapting Title VII sexual harassment analysis 
 
 170. Kells, 210 F.3d at 836-37; Dunn, 1998 WL 182516, at *5. 
 171. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
 172. See supra note 86 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra notes 16, 22 and accompanying text. 
 174. See, e.g., Neagle, supra note 13, at 737; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1496. 
 175. See supra Part III.A. 
 176. See Walton v. Mental Health Ass’n of S.E. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 666 n.2 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 177. Flowers v. S. Reg’l Physician Servs. Inc., 247 F.3d 229, 232 (5th Cir. 2001); Fox v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 247 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2001). 
MYERS - MACRO FINAL 4/30/2003  5:10 PM 
290 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume XVII 
to disability harassment claims under the ADA,178 concerns raised by 
legal commentators reveal that the proper analysis of a disability 
harassment claim is far from fully resolved.179 
B. Potential Alternatives to the Reasonable Person Standard 
As noted above, the analysis of a harassment claim has a subjective 
and an objective component, namely the reasonable person standard180 
that is the main point of controversy.181 Many have indicated the 
potential inadequacy of the reasonable person standard. In the context of 
sexual harassment cases, the use of a reasonable woman standard and a 
reasonable victim standard has been discussed.182 In the specific area of 
disability harassment, legal commentators have suggested use of a 
reasonable person with the same disability standard.183 Finally, the 
EEOC Proposed Guidelines on Harassment184 replace the reasonable 
person standard with a “reasonable person in the same or similar 
circumstances” test.185 Each standard will be briefly discussed in turn. 
 
 178. See supra Part III.E. 
 179. See, e.g., Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-13. 
 180. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text. 
 181. One commentator also has noted that the “severe or pervasive conduct” standard sets a 
high bar that will make the hostile work environment claim inaccessible to many. Melinda Slusser, 
Note: Flowers v. Southern Regional Physician Services: A Step in the Right Direction, 33 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 713, 740 (2002). This criticism, however, does not justify a modification of disability 
harassment analysis until Title VII standards are modified or statutory language or history can be 
identified to merit lowering this bar. 
 182. Jolynn Childers, Note: Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A 
Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE L.J. 854, 
880, 883, 902-04 (1993). Beyond the sexual harassment context, non-neutral standards have been 
utilized under other classes protected by Title VII. See, e.g., Duplessis v. Training & Dev. Corp., 835 
F. Supp. 671, 677 (D. Me. 1993) (using “reasonable Franco-American” standard for hostile work 
environment national origin harassment claim); Harris v. Int’l Paper Co., 765 F. Supp. 1509, 1516 
(D. Me. 1991) (applying “reasonable black person” standard for hostile environment racial 
harassment claim). 
 183. See, e.g., Neagle, supra note 13, at 737; Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-05. Lisa 
Eichhorn criticizes this suggestion because the fact finder inevitably has difficulty fully 
understanding and applying the perspective of a person with a particular disability that the fact finder 
does not have. Instead, she proposes that disability harassment claims apply an objective evaluation 
of the hostility of the work environment “given the circumstance of the plaintiff’s disability.” 
Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 622. Because Eichhorn’s distinction seems to be one more of semantics 
than of substance, it is not addressed in a separate section, although her initial criticism is an 
important one. 
 184. See supra note 118 and accompanying text. 
 185. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, 
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266,51,269 (proposed October 1, 1993). 
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1. The reasonable woman standard in sexual harassment cases 
In the sexual harassment context, there has been discussion of 
whether analysis of claims should utilize a “reasonable woman” rather 
than a “reasonable person” standard.186 The Ninth Circuit applied the 
reasonable woman standard in Ellison v. Brady, reasoning that 
“[c]onduct that many men [would] consider unobjectionable may offend 
many women.”187 This is because the reasonable person standard can be 
applied with a male perspective to reinforce the status quo.188 
Some commentators argue that the reasonable woman standard is an 
imperfect solution because this standard ignores the fact that in a small 
number of cases, the victims of sexual harassment are men.189 Putting 
aside this demographic factor, critics have also identified three 
difficulties created by the reasonable woman standard: the problem in 
defining the reasonable woman; the “marginalization” that is caused by 
using a standard premised on difference; and, practically, the old biases 
that may be tied to such a standard.190 
First, the reasonable woman standard presumes that women as a 
group have a definable, unvaried perspective tied to their status as 
women.191 Further, establishment of a distinct legal category for women 
may perpetuate perception of difference between genders that itself may 
encourage the problem of harassment.192 Finally, courts may apply this 
standard through envisioning a woman that is more like a man so that the 
male perspective is still predominant.193 
2. The reasonable victim standard in sexual harassment cases 
In recognizing these problems with the reasonable woman standard, 
some legal authors instead suggest the use of a “reasonable victim” 
standard because the use of a gender-neutral term narrows the potential 
for bias, marginalization, and reinforcement of traditional gender roles.194 
 
 186. See, e.g., Childers, supra note 182. 
 187. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 188. Childers, supra note 182, at 877. 
 189. Id. at 891-92. 
 190. Id. at 888. 
 191. Id. at 893; Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 620. 
 192. Childers, supra note 182, at 895. 
 193. Id. at 900. This statement may seem ridiculous at first glance. It is based, however, on 
comparison of cases with similar facts, one using the reasonable person standard and the other using 
the reasonable woman standard, that have the same results. Id. at 901. This evaluation reveals the 
stubbornness of gender bias, perhaps given resentment to singling out one gender as meriting unique 
analysis that is reflected in the reasonable woman standard. 
 194. See, e.g., id. at 901-02. But see Leslie M. Kerns, A Feminist Perspective: Why Feminists 
Should Give the Reasonable Woman Standard Another Chance, 10 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 195, 
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Instead, this term emphasizes the power relationship between the parties 
that may be linked to employment positions, not just gender 
difference.195 This refocusing stops a legal analysis from reinforcing the 
gender-biased thinking that may support incidents of sexual harassment 
in the first place. 
This discussion about the appropriate analysis for sexual harassment 
is similarly applicable in the disability harassment context. Just as, given 
traditional gender roles, there may be resentment of female presence in 
the workplace, employers may resist the presence or the affirmative 
requirement of reasonable accommodation of people with disabilities. In 
addition, employers may make unfair and inaccurate assumptions about 
the capabilities of disabled as well as female employees. Finally, people 
with disabilities, like women, come to the workplace with a perspective 
and sensibility that merits acknowledgment even though it is different 
from the mainstream male perspective. 
3. The reasonable person with the same disability standard 
Legal commentator Frank Ravitch proposed a modification to Title 
VII sexual harassment analysis when applied to disability harassment 
cases under the ADA in order to address the distinctions between the two 
statutes and contexts.196 His suggested analysis of disability harassment 
claims would ask: 
(1) whether the alleged victim is a qualified individual with a disability, 
and (2) whether the individual was, or is, subject to intimidating, 
hostile, or abusive conduct based on a known disability, which that 
individual perceived, and a reasonable person with the same disability 
would consider, sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, thereby creating a hostile or 
abusive work environment.197 
Ravitch suggested the reasonable person with the same disability 
standard because the reasonable person standard ignores a fundamental 
provision of the ADA – the affirmative requirement of reasonable 
accommodation198 – that inherently examines the individual needs of 
each employee.199 
 
196-97 (2001) (arguing that the reasonable woman standard is preferable in sexual harassment cases 
precisely because its gender specificity focuses attention on gender roles and gender bias that 
encourage sexual harassment). 
 195. Childers, supra note 182, at 902. 
 196. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1503-05. 
 197. Id. at 1504-05. 
 198. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
 199. Ravitch, supra note 13, at 1508. 
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Just as the reasonable woman standard seeks to highlight the unique 
sensibilities of women, Ravitch’s standard of a reasonable person with 
the same disability focuses attention on the unique perspective of people 
with disabilities. Therefore, Ravitch’s proposal can be evaluated with 
respect to the criticisms raised above about the reasonable woman 
standard.200 First, Ravitch’s standard partially relieves the definitional 
criticism levied against the reasonable woman standard: it considers the 
diversity within the group of people with disabilities by specifying the 
same disability, thus at least narrowing interpretation to be more in line 
with an individual plaintiff. Courts would still face the difficulty of 
discerning what, for example, a reasonable blind person versus a 
reasonable paraplegic may feel.201 
Second, like the reasonable woman standard, however, it also by its 
very name emphasizes the making of a distinction between people with 
disabilities and people without disabilities under the law. Given the 
negative perception of the ADA as an unfair windfall to plaintiffs with 
disabilities,202 such a distinction may invoke negative connotations. As 
such, Ravitch’s standard may further marginalize people with 
disabilities, which may then encourage perceptions that facilitate 
harassment. 
Third, by explicitly identifying a distinct legal category for people 
with disabilities, ingrained biases may be triggered. However, this 
criticism does not have as much force as it does in the gender context 
because the ADA, as a civil rights statute, addresses only people with 
disabilities so that as a class they have already been singularly 
distinguished under the law. While the ADA is very similar to 
protections for the five classes of persons covered by Title VII, there are 
differences, including the affirmative requirement of reasonable 
accommodation and the evaluation of whether a plaintiff is a qualified 
person with a disability.203 Therefore, in sum, all three criticisms of the 
reasonable woman standard are also applicable to the reasonable person 
with the same disability standard, in varying degrees. Nonetheless, 
Ravitch’s standard is a useful step towards recognizing the importance of 
considering the unique sensibilities of the plaintiffs in disability 
harassment cases. 
 
 200. See supra Part IV.B.1. 
 201. See Eichhorn, supra note 6, at 621-22. 
 202. See supra notes 212-13 and accompanying text. 
 203. See supra notes 20-35 and accompanying text. 
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4. The reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard 
The EEOC Proposed Guidelines204 provide a different way to slightly 
modify the reasonable person standard through the suggestion of the 
reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard.205 The 
Guidelines explicitly explain that evaluation with this standard “includes 
consideration of the perspective of persons of the alleged victim’s race, 
color, religion, gender, national origin, age, or disability.”206 
This standard is very similar to language recently used by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in evaluating a same-sex harassment case: “Common 
sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts 
and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among 
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the 
plaintiff’s position would find severely hostile or abusive.”207 
Thus, both the EEOC and the U.S. Supreme Court have used 
language modifying “reasonable person” to encourage the consideration 
of the specific circumstances of an individual plaintiff using neutral 
terms much like the proposed reasonable victim standard. However, 
these two formulations lack the emotional punch of the term “reasonable 
victim.” The reasonable victim standard, unlike these proposals, 
emphasizes the power differential and the alleged harassment that is 
central to the claim.208 
C. A Proposal: The Reasonable Victim Standard in Disability 
Harassment Cases 
Given that many of the same criticisms of the reasonable woman 
standard are present for the reasonable person with the same disabilities 
standard, the reasonable victim standard proposal should be considered 
in the disability harassment context as well. The use of a disability-
neutral term diverts focus from the potential for marginalization or 
bias.209 As a result, this legal test emphasizes the alleged harassment – 
the victimization – rather than a characteristic of the employee that itself 
 
 204. See supra notes 121-24. 
 205. Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National Origin, 
Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 at 51,269 (to be codified 29 C.F.R. § 300). 
 206. Id. 
 207. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998) (emphasis added). In 
addition, this passage encourages “appropriate sensitivity to social context,” which seems to indicate 
that some consideration of the plaintiff’s subjective perspective is appropriate. Id. Michael J. Frank, 
The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 437, 437 
(2002). 
 208. See supra note 195 and accompanying text. 
 209. See supra note 194 and accompanying text. 
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may have stimulated the biases that encouraged the alleged 
harassment.210 This neutrality can also facilitate harmonization in the 
standards applied to all protected classes under the ADA and Title VII. 
The reasonable victim standard focuses on the power disparity in the 
employment relationship on an individualized basis more effectively than 
the reasonable person in the same or similar circumstances standard. 
Disability, like gender, is not something to be ashamed of. The 
purpose of the reasonable victim standard is not to obscure these 
qualities, but to centralize the analysis on the interaction between the 
parties. In applying this standard, courts will consider many factors 
affecting the individual perspective of a victim, including his or her 
disability. Therefore, the claimant’s disability still constitutes one factor 
in evaluating the severity and pervasiveness of the hostile work 
environment. 
In addition, the reasonable victim standard, if adopted in the 
disability harassment context, is potentially also applicable to other 
protected classes, including gender. There would be more harmonization 
and clarity of analysis, specifically of disability harassment claims, if the 
same analysis is used in the context of other types of harassment. The 
U.S. Supreme Court has encouraged facilitating uniformity among 
analysis of harassment based on different characteristics.211 This 
uniformity is appropriate given the large overlap in statutory language, 
interpretation, and application of Title VII and the ADA discussed 
throughout this article. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ADA has been the subject of media portrayal as a windfall 
statute for plaintiffs, some of whom may have questionable disabilities, 
which encourages frivolous litigation.212 In addition to denouncing the 
high volume of lawsuits, critics also have attacked the cost of reasonable 
accommodation.213 Unfortunately, these portrayals of the ADA 
demonstrate a bias against the statute that may discourage courts from 
expanding its enforcement, for example, through expressly recognizing 
another cause of action such as disability harassment. Instead of focusing 
on the cost of accommodation, naysayers should consider the estimated 
$200 to $300 billion cost to the U.S. economy in support payments and 
 
 210. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 211. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 n.1 (1998). 
 212. Ruth Colker, The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Windfall for Defendants, 34 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 99 (1999). 
 213. WALTER OLSON, THE EXCUSE FACTORY: HOW EMPLOYMENT LAW IS PARALYZING THE 
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 102-03 (1997). 
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lost productivity because the skills of people with disabilities are 
underutilized in the workforce,214 likely in part to virtually unchecked 
instances of workplace hostility. 
In order to buttress the contention that a disability harassment claim 
should be cognizable under the ADA, it should be noted that statistics 
reveal that the ADA has so far provided little relief for plaintiffs. 
Defendants win more than 93% of reported ADA employment 
discrimination cases decided on the merits in trial courts; defendants also 
win in 84% of cases that are appealed.215 These statistics reveal less 
success by plaintiffs than in comparative areas of the law, with only 
prisoner rights cases having a similarly low rate of success.216 Therefore, 
courts should not be hesitant because of misguided public opinion to 
implement the ADA to its full extent. 
The many and important similarities between Title VII and the ADA 
clearly indicate the need for and the appropriateness of finding that a 
disability harassment claim is cognizable under the ADA in that such 
claims are similar to harassment claims already recognized under Title 
VII. While most courts have hesitated to endorse this disability 
harassment claim, the difficult aspect of this issue remains determining 
exactly how such a claim should be analyzed. Given a few key 
differences between Title VII and the ADA, most notably the affirmative 
requirement of reasonable accommodation, harassment analysis under 
Title VII cannot be wholly transferred to the ADA context. Incorporating 
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